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We study a dynamic game of incomplete information in which two political parties contest
elections with endogenously formed reputations regarding the preferences that prevail within
each party. Party preferences exhibit serial correlation and change with higher probability
following defeat in elections. We show that when partisans care suﬃciently about oﬃce, extreme
policies are pursued with positive probability by the government if the ruling party is perceived
relatively more extreme than the opposition. In equilibrium such policies occur when (a) both
parties are perceived to be more extreme than a ﬁxed benchmark level, and (b) elections are close
in that both parties have similar reputations. Two qualitatively diﬀerent equilibrium dynamics
are possible depending on the relative speed with which preferences of parties in government
or in the opposition change: One produces regular government turnover and extreme policies
along the path of play, another involves a strong incumbency advantage and policy moderation.
1. Introduction
In the canonical model of two candidate electoral competition, the two contenders for oﬃce
make platform announcements that the electorate takes at face value. In the classic Hotelling
(1929), Downs (1957) version of this model equilibrium platforms converge to the median when the
policy space has one dimension under the assumption that candidates are motivated by the pursuit
of oﬃce. In part to address the criticism that actual elections do not result in identical policy
platforms by the candidates, platform divergence is obtained in equilibrium under the alternative
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1assumption that candidates have policy motivations and face electoral uncertainty (e.g., Wittman
(1983), Calvert (1985)). These models and their variants generate ideals with trivial dynamics,
since they imply either persistent policy convergence or (partial) divergence over time. At least with
regard to partisan competition, empirical observation suggests otherwise. For instance, Downsian
convergence seems to be a fair approximation of British politics in the 50’s and 60’s. But this era
of the “politics of consensus” Kavanagh and Morris (1994) came to an end in the 80’s with the
governments of Margaret Thatcher.
Besides their variable success in explaining policy extremism and their inability to account
for diﬀerent degrees of policy moderation over time, there is another count on which static models of
electoral competition are at odds with empirical observation. In these models both candidates are
in principle able to be competitive in elections since, barring a non-anonymous resolution of voters’
indiﬀerence, a candidate can perform at least as well as the opponent by adopting an identical
platform. Yet, we often observe two party systems in which one of the two parties contesting
for power is widely perceived to have a small or no chance of winning oﬃce, often over multiple
successive elections. This seems to have been the case for the Tories in Britain in the second part
of the 1990’s, but a similar inability of the Labour party to compete eﬀectively against the Tories
occurred in the mid 1980’s. Our objective in this paper is to develop a dynamic model of two
party competition which allows for equilibrium dynamics that are consistent with these empirical
observations.
The model we develop shares features with many static models of electoral competition.
First, we combine the premises of the models of Downs and Wittman and assume candidates with
a mix of oﬃce and policy motivations. Second, as is the case in the citizen-candidate models of
Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), we focus on credible policy choices by
the governing parties and dispense with cheap talk policy platform declarations. Third, while the
citizen-candidate models focus on individual candidacies, we model electoral competition between
political parties which we assume are populated by individuals with diﬀerent policy preferences as
is the case, for example, in the party equilibrium model of Roemer (2000). In particular, we assume
that individuals within the party with diﬀerent policy preferences battle for control of the party in
each period and the outcome of this battle is probabilistic.
We depart from the above models, though, in that we assume that the true preferences
2that prevail within each party are (at least partly) private information. In eﬀect, party preferences
cannot be credibly communicated to other actors in the absence of policy platform commitment,
except possibly via costly policy choices while the party is in oﬃce. Hence, in lieu of party platform
declarations, we assume each political party enters the electoral arena with an endogenously formed
reputation. These reputations are the beliefs of the electorate about the preferences that prevail
within each party and reﬂect the accumulated history of electoral outcomes and policy choices that
have transpired prior to the elections. We also assume that political parties, like all organizations,
exhibit inertia. We formalize this idea by assuming that party preferences are positively serially
correlated: Extremists (Moderates) have a higher probability of prevailing within the party if the
party was controlled by extremists (moderates) in the previous period. Thus, when a party reveals
that it is controlled by extremists by implementing an extreme policy, it damages its reputation for
several electoral cycles. These assumptions deﬁne a stochastic game of incomplete information in
which players’ strategies (those of parties and the voter) are conditioned on parties’ joint reputations
in any given period, and these reputations in turn are rationally updated given past actions.
A ﬁrst ﬁnding from the analysis of this model is that it is inconsistent with Downsian
convergence to the median. No matter how much weight parties place in oﬃce there does not exist
a robust equilibrium in which parties in government implement moderate policies with probability
one independent of their combined reputations. In fact, in the case when parties are impatient
or place signiﬁcant emphasis on policy relative to oﬃce the only equilibrium involves party types
implementing their ideal policy independent of the electorate’s beliefs about the two parties. The
most interesting case, though, on which we devote the bulk of the analysis concerns the situation
when partisans assign signiﬁcant weight on oﬃce utility relative to policy. We report three main
ﬁndings under this assumption. First, we ﬁnd that the policy choice of the parties in government
depends on the joint reputation levels of both competing parties. In particular, the governing party
(on or oﬀ the equilibrium path) pursues an extreme policy with positive probability when it has
a relative reputational disadvantage compared to the opposition party. Second, extreme policies
are observed along the equilibrium path if (a) both parties are perceived to be extreme with a
probability that exceeds a benchmark reputation level, and (b) following close elections, that is,
elections in which both parties have similar reputations. Finally, with regard to policy and electoral
dynamics, the equilibrium is consistent with two radically diﬀerent patterns of competition over
3time. For some values of the parameters that regulate the probability with which party preferences
change, equilibrium dynamics are characterized by moderate policies and a strong incumbency
advantage for the government, as the government maintains a persistent reputational advantage
over the opposition party. But there also exist conﬁgurations of these parameters for which extreme
policies and alternation of parties in government are a regular equilibrium phenomenon that occurs
inﬁnitely often along the path of play. In this case, the opposition’s reputation gradually improves
relative to that of the government and the government is induced to pursue extreme policies with
positive probability upon losing its reputational advantage over the opposition party.
A number of other models explicitly study the dynamics of two party competition but
assume complete information. Kramer (1977) and Wittman (1977) assume that in each period
the incumbent is committed to the policy pursued in the previous period, while the challenger
myopically chooses a vote or policy maximizing platform, respectively. Harrington (1992) and
Aragones, Palfrey and Postlewaite (2007) study equilibrium models of repeated elections with an
explicit focus on party reputations. The term reputation has a diﬀerent meaning in these studies
than the one we adopt in the present analysis. In particular, a reputation in the context of these
studies is the belief about the policy to be chosen by the candidates in equilibrium. In contrast,
a reputation in the present study is the belief of the electorate about the preferences that prevail
within the party. Harrington (1992) and Aragones, Palfrey and Postlewaite (2007) establish the
range of policy choices or reputations other than the candidate’s ideal policy that are consistent
with equilibrium. These equilibrium reputations are built on a form of history dependent strategies
such that upon observing a choice diﬀerent than the one dictated by a candidate’s reputation, the
voters expect that candidate to switch to pursuing her ideal policy for ever after. Alesina (1988) and
Duggan and Fey (2006) study a diﬀerent type of history dependent strategies in repeated election
models in which candidates have policy and oﬃce motivations, respectively. They characterize the
set of subgame perfect equilibria which are consistent with a wide range of policy platform choices
by the parties in Alesina (1988), and include all possible equilibrium policy outcomes in Duggan and
Fey (2006). Dixit, Grossman and Gul (2000), characterize eﬃcient subgame perfect equilibria in a
model in which parties’ re-election probabilities follow an exogenous Markov process conditional on
the incumbent’s policy choice. Besides the fact that we study a model with incomplete information,
another diﬀerence with these studies is that we focus on Markovian equilibria, so that the diﬀerent
4players (partisans, voters, etc.) do not coordinate on complex history dependent strategies.
Among models with incomplete information, Alesina and Cukierman (1990) study a two
period model under the assumption that the candidates’ preferences in the second period are serially
correlated with their ﬁrst period preferences, as is assumed in the present inﬁnite period model.
Their analysis focuses on the ﬁrst period policy choice, emphasizing the strategic incentive of the
candidates to choose a moderate policy in order to win reelection. Thus, their study does not
involve the type of dynamic analysis we pursue. Repeated elections under incomplete information
about candidate preferences are studied by Duggan (2000), Bernhardt, Dubey and Hughson (2004),
and Banks and Duggan (2008).1 These models are suitable for the study of elections in which the
candidates are individuals so that it is plausible to assume, as these authors do, that challengers
to the incumbent are drawn from an identical pool of possible candidates over time. On the other
hand, the assumption that challengers are drawn from a stationary distribution seems inappropriate
for partisan candidacies because inertia within party organizations will typically imply that past
choices by the challenger party contain information about the reputation of that party.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model.
In section 3 we study simple equilibria of this model such that party strategies are independent
of the conﬁguration of party reputations. The main equilibrium analysis appears in section 4,
where we analyze the case in which parties value oﬃce signiﬁcantly compared to policy. We discuss
equilibrium properties and equilibrium dynamics for that case in section 5. In section 6 we extend
the analysis to allow for probabilistic elections. We conclude in section 7.
2. Model
We consider two parties and an electorate that interact over an inﬁnity of periods t =
0,1,.... We model the electorate as a pivotal or median voter, M, and denote a generic party by
P, which is either a left-wing party (P = L) or a right-wing party (P = R). We use −P to denote
the party in opposition of party P. Each of the two parties contains individuals with two diﬀerent
ideological convictions, call them moderates and extremists, who vie for control of the party in each
period. We deﬁne the type τ ∈ {e,m} of the party in a given period as one of the two groups,
1Other models of incomplete information, such as Ferejohn (1986), focus on the fact that the incumbent’s action
while in oﬃce is unobserved (hidden action) and can be traced to Barro (1973). Rogoﬀ (1990), Banks and Sundaram
(1993), and Ashworth (2005) combine aspects of both models.
5extremists or moderates, whose preferences prevail within the party in that period. We assume
that a party of type τ that is in opposition in period t is of the same type in period t + 1 with
probability πo
τ ∈ [0,1]. Similarly, if the governing party is of type τ in period t it is of the same type
in period t + 1 with probability π
g
τ ∈ [0,1]. We assume that these transition probabilities satisfy
πg
τ > πo
τ, τ ∈ {e,m}, and (1)
πo
e > 1 − πo
m. (2)
Inequality (1) states that parties are more likely to change type while in opposition than while the
party is in government, since electoral defeat naturally triggers internal shifts of power within the
losing parties. Inequality (2), in conjunction with (1), amounts to the assumption that party types
are positively serially correlated so that parties are more likely to be of type τ if they were of the
same type in the previous period.
Parties know the realization of their own type in each period, but other players cannot
directly verify the type that prevails within each party. Instead, players rationally update beliefs
about the probability that (other) parties are moderate or extreme. We will refer to these beliefs
as the reputation of each party which at the beginning of each period t we represent by a pair
of probabilities bt = (bt
L,bt
R) ∈ [0,1]2. Thus, for example, probability bt
L represents the belief of
voter M (and party R) in period t that party L is extreme. The initial party reputations b0 are
exogenously given. Party reputations reﬂect uncertainty by extra-partisan players regarding the
outcome of the internal battle for control of the party between extremists and moderates due to,
for example, irreducible uncertainty about the preferences of inﬂuential decision makers within the
party who may have strategically concealed their true ideological convictions from the public in
order to gain prominence within the party, shifting internal party alliances that take place behind
the scenes and permit losing ideological groups to exercise control on party decisions, or perhaps
due to the stochastic nature of the process via which older partisans retire and younger party
members with unknown preferences gain inﬂuence within the party. While parties may implicitly
take (unmodeled) actions that optimally mitigate some of the sources of this uncertainty, we assume
that the eﬀect of any such actions is already captured by the probabilities πo
τ and π
g
τ so that the
reputation of each party reﬂects the residual uncertainty of individuals outside the party about the
6type of the party that cannot be credibly reduced by publicly observed actions of partisans except,
possibly, through the policy choice of the party when in government.
Each period in the game represents a complete political cycle. First, elections take place
in which voter M chooses whether to reelect previous period’s government or not. Then the
party/type elected in government implements a policy xt ∈ X. Extreme types of party P can
choose between their favorite policy x
P
e and a moderate policy x
P
m, while moderate types of either
party always implement the moderate policy of their party x
P
m.2 Thus, in general, there are four








e}. Following the policy choice of the governing party,
which is publicly observed, nature chooses a new type for each party, players update their beliefs,
and the game moves to the next period. In that period, the voter elects a new government, the
governing party implements a policy, new partisan types are realized, etc.
If policy x
P
τ ∈ X is implemented in period t, then voter M’s payoﬀ in that period is given by
v
P
τ ∈ R, while extremists of party R receive r
P
τ ∈ R and extremists of party L receive l
P
τ ∈ R.3 We








τ for τ ∈ {e,m} and P ∈ {L,R}.












e, that is, the voter prefers moderate policies
and extremists of each party prefer the respective partisan policy most, moderate policies next,









m is a common policy. This permits a convergence to




m so that there may exist residual
partisanship even if the moderates are the prevailing group within each party. Parties receive
additional oﬃce payoﬀ when they control the government so that extreme partisans receive utility
G > 0 when their party is in government.4 We assume that the voter is strategic but cares only
about the policy outcome in the current period. Partisan types are (potentially) more farsighted
and care about the electoral and policy outcome in two periods, the current period t as well as
period t + 1. The weight parties place on the outcome of the next period is given by a discount
factor δ ∈ [0,1].
We will focus our attention to equilibria in strategies that are appropriately Markovian.
2While we do not allow moderates to choose between the available policies, this is the behavior that would arise
endogenously in an equilibrium of the type we characterize.
3Since moderate partisan types always pursue the same action, we only specify payoﬀs for the voter and the two
extreme partisan types (left and right).
4While the oﬃce payoﬀ G is independent of the type that prevails within the party, we can easily accommodate
diﬀerent oﬃce payoﬀs for extreme partisans depending on the type that controls the party when the party is in oﬃce.
7Given the structure of the model, the relevant strategic environment for the party in government
is summarized by the reputations of the two parties.5 Thus, a strategy for an extreme type e of
governing party P is given by a function σP : [0,1]2 → [0,1], P ∈ {L,R}. Accordingly, σP(b) is the
probability that extreme type e of party P implements policy x
P
e when party reputations are given
by b ∈ [0,1]2. We express the choice of the voter between the two parties as a reelection strategy
σM : [0,1]2×{L,R} → [0,1], so that this strategy is conditioned on the pair of beliefs about the two
parties as well as the identity of the incumbent government party. Accordingly, the voter reelects
the incumbent party in government P by setting σM(b,P) = 1, and elects the opposition party by
setting σM(b,P) = 0. We denote a strategy proﬁle for all three players by σ = (σM,σL,σR).
Players update their beliefs regarding the extremism of the two parties at two stages within
a period. First, players update beliefs about the type of the party in government after observing
its policy choice. Let β(bt,x;σ), where β : [0,1]2 × X → [0,1], denote the updated belief of the
electorate about the type of the governing party P ∈ {L,R} after observed policy x ∈ X and
party reputations bt ∈ [0,1]2 in period t and strategies given by σ. The second change in party
reputations between periods t and t + 1 occurs due to the possibility of internal ideological shifts




e] for the reputation of
the governing party, parameterized by the probabilities π
g
τ as Tg(b) = π
g
eb + (1 − π
g
m)(1 − b), and
similarly deﬁne To : [0,1] → [1 − πo
m,πo
e] for the opposition party as To(b) = πo
eb + (1 − πo
m)(1 − b).
Now, if beliefs at the beginning of period t are given by bt ∈ [0,1]2, if the party in government in
period t is Pt, and if this party implements a policy xt ∈ X, then the beliefs of the electorate in
period t+1 are given by bt+1 = b
0
(bt,xt;σ), where the coordinate of function b
0
: [0,1]2×X → [0,1]2







Tg(β(bt,xt;σ)) if P = Pt
To(bt
P) if P 6= Pt.
(3)
Let V (b,P;σ) be the expected payoﬀ of voter M from electing party P when party rep-
utations are given by b ∈ [0,1]2 and strategies are denoted by σ, and let UP(b,x
P
τ;σ) denote the
expected payoﬀ of party P from implementing a policy x
P
τ while in government in a period with
party reputations b. Explicit expressions for these expected payoﬀs are provided in equations (16)
5 For a dynamic game in which players’ Markov strategies are conditioned on beliefs in a similar fashion, see
Mailath and Samuelson, 2001.
8and (17) in the Appendix. We can now state the deﬁnition of the equilibrium concept which is a
version of Markov Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium:









1 if V (b,P;σ∗) > V (b,−P;σ∗)

















for all b ∈ [0,1]2 and all P ∈ {L,R}, and a reputations updating rule b0 that satisﬁes (3) and is

















In (6) we require players to use Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs about the governing party
after observing its policy choice, but we also eﬀectively restrict certain out of equilibrium beliefs
by assuming that other players believe the government party is extreme with probability one after
observing an extreme policy even when its strategy dictates a moderate policy with probability
one (σ∗
P(b) = 0). We do not restrict out of equilibrium beliefs in cases when a moderate policy is
observed and bPσ∗
P(b) = 1, but the ﬂexibility allowed by the absence of any such restriction is of
no consequence for the equilibrium analysis that follows. Indeed, such a restriction is redundant if
π
g
e < 1 since then we cannot have party P with reputation bP = 1 in periods other than the very
ﬁrst along any path of play. We reﬁne the equilibrium concept as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 An equilibrium with strategies σ∗ is robust if there exists an ε > 0, ε < 1
2, such that
for each ε ∈ (0,ε), the voting strategy σ∗





   
   
1 − ε if σ∗






9Informally an equilibrium is robust if the voter’s strategy is a best response even if party
strategies involve trembling. The objective of the reﬁnement is to resolve the electorate’s possible
indiﬀerence in a manner that is responsive to its beliefs about the relative extremism of the two
parties. Such indiﬀerence may arise, for example, in cases when both parties are expected to
pursue a moderate policy with probability one following the election. If parties may tremble as in
(7), though, the voter strictly prefers that between the two parties that is perceived less extreme.
There is a more direct (and apparently more restrictive) manner to impose such a reﬁnement. In
particular, we deﬁne an intuitive equilibrium as follows:







1 if bP < b-P
0 if bP > b-P.
(8)
With the solution concept clariﬁed, we proceed to the analysis of the game. First we
consider analogues of pooling and separating equilibria for this game. In such equilibria extreme
partisan types pursue the same policy (moderate or extreme, respectively) independent of party
reputations, hence we call these equilibria simple. The chief equilibrium results are contained in
section 4, where we consider robust equilibria that are not simple and involve parties that place
high weight in oﬃce (high G) and in the future (high δ). Then, in section 5 we discuss equilibrium
dynamics and other equilibrium properties.
3. Simple Equilibria
In this section we consider two simple types of equilibria in which parties’ strategy does
not depend on party reputations. First, in Proposition 1 we give a precise range of parameters for
which extreme partisan types implement extreme policies whenever in power, independent of party
reputations b ∈ [0,1]2. We have:
Proposition 1
(i) An equilibrium with party strategies satisfying σP(b) = 1 for all b ∈ [0,1]2, P ∈ {L,R}, exists


















(ii) Every equilibrium with party strategies that satisfy σP(b) = 1 for all b ∈ [0,1]2, P ∈ {L,R} is
robust and intuitive.
(iii) If inequality (9) is strict then party strategies satisfy σP(b) = 1 for all b ∈ [0,1]2, P ∈ {L,R},
in every equilibrium.
Part (iii) of the proposition establishes that when condition (9) holds with the inequality
strict all equilibria of the game involve extreme partisan types pursuing their ideal policy, indepen-
dent of the electorate’s beliefs. This is despite the fact that in these equilibria parties implementing
extreme policies lose the election with probability one, as is implied by the fact that these equilibria
are intuitive by part (ii) of the proposition. Thus, according to condition (9) such punishment is not
suﬃcient to induce moderation when either (a) parties are impatient (low δ), or (b) parties place
low value to oﬃce (low G), or (c) the loss in utility due to the policies pursued by the opposition




m), or (d) when the ability of extremists to




One may conjecture that when these conditions are reversed we may instead obtain a simple
‘pooling’ equilibrium in which extreme partisan types always imitate the moderate partisan types
by pursuing a moderate policy. It is possible to construct such equilibria (for high enough G & δ)
exploiting voters’ indiﬀerence, but these equilibria are not robust. Indeed we can show that there
does not exist a robust ‘pooling’ equilibrium:
Proposition 2 There does not exist a robust equilibrium such that σP(b) = 0 for all b ∈ [0,1]2,
P ∈ {L,R}.
Thus the analogue to a convergence-to-the-median result is not attainable in this dynamic
game in a robust equilibrium. The reasoning behind Proposition 2 is straightforward. If all party
types choose moderate policies independent of the electorate’s beliefs, then the electorate is indif-
ferent between the two parties. Then, in a robust equilibrium the voter elects that between the two
parties that has a (strictly) better reputation. Thus, a party that is in government, is controlled
by extremists, and is perceived to be more extreme than the opposition even after implementing
11a moderate policy has no incentive to pursue such a moderate policy. This party faces electoral
defeat independent of its policy choice, so types in control of the party might as well pursue their
ideal policy.
In combination, Propositions 1 and 2 imply that when condition (9) fails a robust equi-
librium must involve some conﬁguration of reputations at which there is a positive probability of
extreme policies pursued by extreme types as well as reputations at which such types choose a
moderate policy with positive probability. We take the analysis of such more interesting equilibria
in the next section.
4. Equilibrium with Oﬃce Motivations
Our goal in this section is to establish an equilibrium when condition (9) fails and parties
are suﬃciently patient and motivated predominantly by oﬃce considerations (high G). When
parties are motivated by oﬃce they are willing to pursue a moderate policy even when they are
controlled by extremists, if such a policy secures them reelection. Note that for any strategies σ
a governing party’s reputation cannot deteriorate following a choice of a moderate policy (i.e., we
have β(b P,x
P
m;σ) ≤ b P). Hence, the updated pair of party reputations determined by (3) ensures
that the incumbent party will enjoy a better reputation than the opposition in the following election








Thus, in an intuitive equilibrium the governing party P will pursue a moderate policy with probabil-
ity one for all party reputations b ∈ [0,1]2 such that Tg(b P) < To(b -P). Such a (relative) reputational
advantage and a moderate policy lead to reelection with probability one, and partisans that care a
lot about oﬃce will follow a moderate policy in all such cases.
The situation is rather diﬀerent when the governing party P is in power with party repu-
tations b in the set BP deﬁned by
BP = {b ∈ [0,1]2 : Tg(bP) > To(b-P)}.
12If the incumbent party pursues a moderate policy with probability one at such reputations, the
policy of the government conveys no information to the electorate regarding the government’s type
(i.e., β(b P,x
P




Tg(bP) > To(b-P) = b0
-P(b,x
P
m;σ) and party P loses the election despite its attempt to appear
moderate. Thus, pursuing a moderate policy with probability one at these reputation levels is not
part of an intuitive equilibrium. Similarly, it is not an equilibrium for extremists of party P to
implement an extreme policy with probability one. If such an extreme policy were pursued by
extremists with probability one, then extremists would have an incentive to deviate and implement
a moderate policy instead which would convince the electorate that the party is moderate and
would secure them reelection. Thus, the only possibility for equilibrium policy making by party P
at reputation levels b ∈ BP is a mixed strategy. As we show in Propositions 3 and 6, by allowing
the voter to also use a mixed strategy we can establish that such a robust equilibrium exists. The
equilibrium is such that the governing party’s mixture probability between moderate and extreme
policies makes it barely competitive against its opponent at the elections when the realization of





















if Tg(bP) > To(b-P)
0 otherwise
(11)
for each P ∈ {L,R}.
(ii) The probability of an extreme policy in this equilibrium by a government of party P, bPσP(b),
(weakly) increases with the governing party’s reputation bP and (weakly) decreases with the
reputation of the opposition, b-P.
(iii) The equilibrium probability of an extreme policy in a period with party reputations b is positive
13if and only if













(iv) For a ﬁxed reputation level bP, the equilibrium probability of an extreme policy by party P is
maximum when party −P’s reputation equals that of party P (bP = b-P) and decreases with
the absolute diﬀerence between b-P and bP.
The equilibrium in Proposition 3 holds for arbitrarily large values of the oﬃce payoﬀ G,
as long as parties place some weight in the future (δ > 0). Thus, no matter how much weight
parties place in oﬃce, there exists a conﬁguration of party reputations that makes it worthwhile
for extreme partisan types to pursue extreme policies when in government. Figure 1(a) displays a
contour plot of the equilibrium probability of an extreme policy choice by extreme partisans of party
L in the space of party reputations [0,1]2. As we have already discussed, a party must be perceived
relatively more extreme than it’s opposition in order for it to pursue extreme policies with positive
probability. Note that from the perspective of the electorate the expected probability that, say,
party L will pursue an extreme policy given reputations b ∈ [0,1]2 is equal to bLσL(b). In Figure 1(b)
we plot this probability. This graph illustrates the comparative static in part (ii) of Proposition
3, that is, that the probability of an extreme policy by the governing party increases with that
party’s reputation level and decreases with that of the opposition party. The more disadvantaged
the government party is, the more surprising a moderate policy by such a government must be in
order for such a moderate policy to convince the electorate that the governing party is as likely to
be moderate as the opposition, rendering the subsequent election competitive. Thus, the worse the
governing party’s reputation is relative to the opposition, the more likely it is that that party will
pursue an extreme policy in equilibrium.
The fact that the party strategies in the equilibrium of Proposition 3 are such that govern-
ments may pursue extreme policies for some conﬁgurations of party reputations is not suﬃcient to
produce extreme policies in equilibrium. Indeed, the voter can ensure that a moderate policy pre-
vails with probability one at reputation levels such that one of the two competing parties pursues a
moderate policy with probability one. Hence, since the voter prefers moderate policies, a positive












Figure 1: Party Strategies and Probability of Extreme Policies.
best between two evils, that is, for reputation levels such that both parties would pursue extreme
policies with positive probability if elected. As stated in part (iii) of Proposition 3, the set of such
reputation levels, Be, lies in the upper quadrant of the space of party reputations. By part (iv) of
Proposition 3 we conclude that two conditions produce extreme policies in equilibrium: (a) The
two parties are perceived to be relatively extreme (both have reputations above level b∗ deﬁned in
part (iii) of Proposition 3), and (b) the two parties have similar reputation levels. If we interpret
the proximity of the two parties’ reputation levels as a proxy for the closeness of the election, then
the second of the above two conditions states that extreme policies emerge with higher probability
after close elections. When the parties’ reputations are at high levels and close to each other, the
opposition is likely to enjoy an improved reputation in the next period. This prospect places the
government at a relative disadvantage, and it is the anticipation of this future electoral disadvan-
tage that produces extreme policies in equilibrium. Figure 1(c) plots the probability of an extreme
policy by the party elected in government as a function of the two parties’ reputation levels.
While Proposition 3 establishes the existence of a robust equilibrium, it leaves open the
possibility that additional equilibria may exist. In the next Proposition we show that under an
additional condition the equilibrium of Proposition 3 is essentially unique in the class of intuitive
equilibria.




















Then party strategies satisfy (11) in every intuitive equilibrium.












e). In sum, in this section we established
a robust intuitive equilibrium when partisans are primarily oﬃce motivated. We showed that
this equilibrium produces extreme policies in equilibrium when both parties are perceived to be
relatively extreme and after close elections. Whether the combination of these two conditions on
party reputations arises frequently in equilibrium depends on the dynamics on party reputations
induced by this equilibrium. We turn to a study of these dynamics in the next section.
5. Reputation and Policy Dynamics
In order to understand the dynamics induced by the equilibrium in Proposition 3, we must
determine the direction and rate of change of the reputation of the government and the opposition
along the path of play. Towards that end observe ﬁrst that, irrespective of equilibrium strategies,









where bo uniquely solves the equation To(bo) = bo. Second, if we assume that there is a positive




e < 2) and
that the government’s policy choice is not informative about its type, then the governing party’s











where in this case bg uniquely solves Tg(bg) = bg. In order to combine these two remarks to
determine the reputation dynamics induced in equilibrium, we ﬁrst establish a lemma concerning
the two reputation levels bo and bg.
16Lemma 1 For all πo
e,πo









(i) If b > bo then b > To(b) > bo and if b < bo then b < To(b) < bo.
(ii) If b > bg then b > Tg(b) > bg and if b < bg then b < Tg(b) < bg.













Parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1 establish the monotonic convergence of reputations towards
the non-equilibrium steady-state levels bo and bg, respectively. Condition (13) in part (iii) provides





is the relative probability with which parties switch from being extreme to being moderate when




m represents the relative probability
with which parties switch from being moderate to being extreme when in government versus when
in opposition. Thus, part (iii) of Lemma 1 states that the non-equilibrium steady-state reputation
for parties in opposition, bo, is lower than that for parties in government, bg, when parties in
government tend to switch from being moderate to extreme with higher relative frequency than
the relative frequency of switching from being extreme to being moderate.
The next step in our analysis is to show that, despite the fact that bo and bg constitute
non-equilibrium steady-state levels of reputation, these quantities constrain the possible long-term
dynamics on party reputations under the equilibrium of Proposition 3 as follows:
Lemma 2 Assume party strategies given by (11). For every (possibly non-equilibrium) voting
strategy σM, for every initial reputations b0 ∈ [0,1]2, and every sequence of party reputations































































17Note that Lemma 2 allows for voter strategies that may diﬀer from the equilibrium strate-
gies in Proposition 3. In combination with part (iii) of Lemma 1, Lemma 2 permits a detailed
characterization of equilibrium dynamics. In particular, condition (13) of Lemma 1 provides a
succinct criterion to categorize the dynamics that are possible in the equilibrium of Proposition 3





m < 2 and bg > bo > b∗): Policy Extremism
When condition (13) holds then both non-equilibrium steady-state reputation levels of the
opposition and governing parties bo and bg, respectively, exceed the reputation level b∗ character-
ized in part (iii) of Proposition 3. As a result, by part (i) of Lemma 2 we conclude that party
reputations are absorbed in the right-top quadrant of the space of reputations deﬁned by (b∗,1]2.
Furthermore, we will argue that starting from any reputations in (b∗,1]2 the government party is
eventually guaranteed to impelement extreme policies with positive probability along the path of
play. Substantively, these extreme policies arise because condition (13) guarantees that in spite
of any initial reputational advantage for the government, the opposition party eventually enjoys
a competitive reputation level. Thus, a pattern of policy making emerges whereby governments
may maintain a better reputation than the opposition by pursuing moderate policies in their initial
terms in oﬃce, but that initial advantage dissipates and governments face competitive elections
and pursue extreme policies with positive probability in subsequent terms until they are replaced
by the opposition party. In the next few paragraphs we provide a more formal demonstration of
this argument.
Note that for any party reputations bt ∈ (b∗,1]2, if the governing party in period t imple-
ments a moderate policy with probability one (i.e., if bt / ∈ BP), then party reputations must reach
the set Be deﬁned in part (iii) of Proposition 3 in a ﬁnite number of k periods. First, since party P




-P) by the deﬁnition of the set BP.









the k-times compositions of the mappings Tg and To, respectively, and party P is reelected with

























Goverment by Party R.
Goverment by Party L.
Figure 2: Equilibrium Dynamics.










so that there must exist ﬁnite k such that bt+k ∈ Be. As we already discussed, when condition (13)
holds, the opposition party may lose a number of elections but it eventually overcomes its initial
reputation disadvantage to the government party thus inducing extreme types of the government
party to pursue extreme policies with positive probability. It follows from the above and by part (iii)
of Proposition 3 that extreme policies and alternation of the party in government occur inﬁnitely
often along the path of play.
Next, note that when party P is elected in government following an extreme policy by party
−P, it is facing an opposition with a reputation level that exceeds the level bo (i.e., b-P = π
g
e > bo)
and this implies that both party reputations eventually exceed the level bo. This is because the
opposition party’s reputation remains above bo in all periods before it is re-elected in government
(by part (i) of Lemma 1), while the governing party’s reputation either matches the reputation
of the opposition party (by part (iii) of Lemma 4 in the appendix) or it adjusts monotonically
towards bg > bo following moderate policies by the government or it becomes equal to π
g
e > bo
following an extreme policy by the government. It follows that party reputations are absorbed
in [bo,1]2 ⊂ (b∗,1]2 once the minimum reputation of the parties satisﬁes min{bt
L,bt
R} > bo. Now
consider any period t with reputations bt ∈ [bo,1]2 and assume that moderate policies occur in all
periods t,t + 1,...,t + ¯ k for some ﬁnite ¯ k. If ¯ k is large enough, then by our earlier arguments it
must be that bt+k ∈ Be for some k < ¯ k. As a result, for all periods t + k + 1,...,t + ¯ k in which the






-P > ... > bt+¯ k
P = bt+¯ k
-P > bo.
Thus, invoking parts (ii), (iii), and (iv) of Proposition 3 we conclude that the probability of an
extreme policy in all periods t0 = t + k + 1,...,t + ¯ k satisﬁes bt0
PσP(bt0
) ≥ boσP(bo,bo) > 0. It
follows that the probability that all policies in periods t+1,...,t+ ¯ k are moderate is smaller than
[1 − boσP(bo,bo)]
¯ k−k, a quantity that goes to zero as ¯ k increases. Since this is true for any initial
20period t with reputations bt ∈ [bo,1]2, the above argument establishes part (i) of Proposition 5
which we state at the end of this section. In particular, an extreme policy is guaranteed to occur
with probability that gets close to one within any ﬁxed window of consecutive time periods, for
a large enough such window of consecutive time periods. Thus, when condition (13) is met, the
equilibrium in Proosition 3 induces alternation of parties in government and extreme policies that





m < 2 and bg < bo < b∗): Policy Moderation & Incumbency Advantage
Unlike the equilibrium dynamics we characterized in the previous case, part (i) of Lemma
2 now implies that when bg < bo < b∗ party reputations eventually lie outside the subset[b∗,1]2
with probability one. As a consequence, by part (iii) of Proposition 3, governments implement a
moderate policy with probability one. It is also the case that for party reputations b / ∈ [b∗,1]2,
the government party wins reelection with probability one by pursuing a moderate policy. As a
result, in this case we obtain dynamics such that either party reputations converge to (bg,bo) / ∈ BL
and a government by party L implements a moderate policy and wins reelection perpetually, or
party reputations converge to (bo,bg) / ∈ BR and party R implements a moderate policy and wins






m < 2 and bg = bo = b∗)
In the special case when the ratios in condition (13) are exactly equal, the equilibrium
induces two qualitatively diﬀerent dynamics that depend on initial reputations. If initial reputations
satisfy b0 / ∈ (b∗,1]2, then by part (i) of Lemma 2 we conclude that bt / ∈ (b∗,1]2 for all periods t.
Thus, by part (iii) of Proposition 3, policies remain moderate with probability one along the path
of play and the government is re-elected with probability one. Lemma 2 then ensures that party
reputations converge to the pair (bo,bo). If, on the other hand, initial reputations satisfy b0 ∈ (b∗,1]2
then party reputations may reach the set Be along the path of play, so that extreme policies are
possible in equilibrium. Nevertheless, the minimum party reputation converges towards the long-
run level bo by Lemma 2 so that for any  > 0 there exists a ¯ t such that for all periods t > ¯ t extreme
policies can occur in equilibrium only for party reputations bt ∈ Be∩[b∗,b∗+]2. But the maximum
21probability of an extreme policy in set Be ∩ [b∗,b∗ + ]2 is given by σP(b∗ + ,b∗ + ) by part (iv)
of Proposition 3 hence (since lim
→0
σP(b∗ +,b∗ +) = 0) a moderate policy prevails with probability






m = 1 and bo = b∗)
This case is otherwise identical to case IIIa, except for two possible diﬀerences. First, the
minimum party reputation in this subcase may converge to a level lower than bo when initial party
reputations satisfy b0 / ∈ [b∗,1]2. In particular, in those cases the party in government (say party P)
enjoys a reputation that is lower to that of the opposition, bP < b-P, and implements a moderate




m = 1, the reputation of the government party
remains constant at its initial level bt
P = b0
P = Tg(b0
P),t > 0, while the opposition party’s reputation
converges to b∗ = bo. Second, for initial party reputations b0 ∈ (b∗,1]2, arguments similar to those
used in case I demonstrate that the set of reputations Be is reached inﬁnitely often along the path
of play. Nevertheless, as was shown in subcase IIIa, the probability of an extreme policy goes to
zero over time and joint party reputations converge in probability to the pair (bo,bo). Speciﬁcally,
by part (ii) of Lemma 2 we conclude that the minimum party reputation does not increase along the
path of play, since the governing party’s reputation (say bt
P) remains constant when bt / ∈ BP, while
when bt ∈ BP the minimum reputation decreases to min{bt+1
P ,bt+1










With the above analysis we have eﬀectively shown the following proposition which summa-
rizes the dynamics of the equilibrium in Proposition 3.
Proposition 5 Let bt,Pt,xt, t = 0,1,... be the sequence of reputations, parties in government, and
policies, respectively, induced by the equilibrium in Proposition 3.
(i) If bg > bo > b∗ then there exists ¯ t such that party reputations satisfy bt ∈ [bo,1]2 for all periods
t > ¯ t. In addition, for all  > 0 there exists ¯ k such that for all periods t > ¯ t the sequence of
policies {xt+1,...,xt+¯ k} satisﬁes




e} = ∅] < . (14)
22(ii) If bg < bo < b∗ then there exists ¯ t such that moderate policies prevail with probability one
(σPt(bt) = 0) for all periods t > ¯ t, and either party reputations converge to (bg,bo) with
a government by party L (i.e., lim
t→+∞
bt = (bg,bo) and lim
t→+∞
Pt = L) or party reputations
converge to (bg,bo) with a government by party R (i.e., lim
t→+∞
bt = (bo,bg) and lim
t→+∞
Pt = R).
(iii) If bo = b∗ and if initial reputations b0 ∈ (bo,1]2 then the probability of extreme policies
goes to zero in the long-run and party reputations converge in probability to (bo,bo) (i.e.,
lim
t→+∞
σPt(bt) = 0 and plim
t→+∞
bt = (bo,bo)). If initial reputations satisfy b0 ∈ [0,1]2\(bo,1]2 then





m < 2 then party reputations converge to (bo,bo) with one of the two parties
perpetually in power (i.e., lim
t→+∞
bt = (bo,bo), and lim
t→+∞







m = 1 then either party reputations converge to (b0
L,bo) with a government





Pt = L) or party reputations converge to
(bo,b0






Parts (i), (ii), and (iii) of Proposition 5 correspond to the three cases I, II, and III, respectively, that
we identiﬁed in the discussion of the dynamics induced by the equilibrium of Proposition 3. Note
that the integer ¯ k in part (i) of the proposition is a function of , but can be chosen independent of
the period t once party reputations are absorbed in the subset [bo,1]2 of party reputations. Since
policies are moderate with probability one in the long run in cases (ii) and (iii) of Proposition
5, the equilibrium in Proposition 3 is consistent with two radically diﬀerent patterns of policy-




indeterminacy suggests an obvious direction for future research, that is, in order to identify the
relevant equilibrium dynamic we must further study the process of internal party competition and
the forces that determines the transition probabilities πo
τ and π
g
τ. As an empirical matter, these
quantities can be inferred from the likelihood over observed data induced by the equilibrium of the
model, a task pursued by Kalandrakis and Spirling (2008).
6. Probabilistic Elections
The model we have considered so far constitutes a clean benchmark on the basis of which
we can evaluate the consequences of introducing more complicated assumptions. In this section
23we consider one such extension, namely the possibility of probabilistic elections. It is reasonable
to assume that events out of the control of the two political parties may inﬂuence the outcome of
the electoral campaign and give a critical electoral advantage to one of the two competing parties.
Such exogenous events can be both favorable to the incumbent government (e.g., a victorious war or
success in foreign policy) or the opposition (e.g., scandals involving the government, etc.). These
events may simply represent a temporary swing in the electorate’s ideological convictions. To
incorporate this possibility in the model, we assume that in each period there is an (exogenous)
probability s < 1
2 of an electoral surprise so that the incumbent government is reelected with
probability
(1 − s)σM(b,P) + s(1 − σM(b,P)).6
As a result, if voter M chooses to re-elect the incumbent government it is re-elected with probability
1−s, while if voter M chooses not to re-elect the government it is re-elected with probability s and
we have 1 − s > s by the restriction that s < 1
2. In the next proposition we show that under this
assumption and a condition on players’ patience and oﬃce payoﬀ which is analogous to condition
(10) we obtain a robust, intuitive equilibrium with the same party strategies as those obtained in
the equilibrium of Proposition 3:























Then there exists a robust and intuitive equlibrium with party strategies given by (11).
Condition (15) is a suﬃcient (not necessary) condition for existence of equilibrium that is
guaranteed to be satisﬁed for large enough G, that is, if parties care suﬃciently about oﬃce. Note
that when it comes to players’ strategies the equilibrium in Proposition 6 is essentially identical
to that in Proposition 3. Thus, the main eﬀect of the introduction of probabilistic elections is a
modiﬁcation of the dynamics induced by this equilibrium. One clear diﬀerence in these dynamics
has to do with the pattern of alternation of parties in government over time. As we established in
parts (ii) and (iii)-(b) of Proposition 5, Proposition 3 permits dynamics such that the governing
6A slightly more complicated assumption in the same spirit is to assume s is an appropriate function of the
electorate’s beliefs b ∈ [0,1]





Figure 3: Probability of an Extreme Policy when s > 0.
party wins reelection with probability one in all periods. Obviously, once we assume probabilistic
elections (s > 0) such strong incumbency advantage is no longer possible as the government must
lose the election with probability that is at least as large as s in any equilibrium. This also implies
that there is positive probability that a party may remain in government even after implementing
an extreme policy.
The second implication of allowing for probabilistic elections has to do with changes in
equilibrium reputation and policy dynamics, since it is now possible that extreme policies occur
in equilibrium even for party reputations outside the set Be deﬁned in part (iii) of Proposition
3. In Figure 3 we depict the equilibrium probability of an extreme policy being implemented for
diﬀerent party reputations assuming s > 0. As is evident by a comparison with the corresponding
probability when s = 0 depicted in Figure 1(c), the probability of an extreme policy is positive if
and only if party reputations satisfy b ∈ BL ∪ BR when we assume s > 0, whereas in Proposition
3 this was the case only for the smaller subset of party reputations Be = BL ∩ BR. Nevertheless,
extreme policies occur at reputations b ∈ (BL ∪ BR) \ Be only after an electoral surprise, so that
the probability of such policies when bP > b-P is given by sbPσP(b) < s. Note that Lemma 2 still
applies when it comes to the equilibrium of Proposition 6, so that we can now derive the following
extension of Proposition 5:
Proposition 7 Assume s > 0 and let bt,Pt,xt, t = 0,1,... be the sequence of reputations, parties
in government, and policies, respectively, induced by the equilibrium in Proposition 6.
25(i) If bg > bo > b∗ then the conclusions of part (i) of Proposition 5 hold.
(ii) If bg < bo < b∗ then
(a) If Tg(bo) < To(bg) there exists ¯ t such that for all periods t > ¯ t moderate policies prevail
with probability one, σPt(bt) = 0, and party reputations satisfy bt ∈ [bg,bo]2.
(b) If Tg(bo) > To(bg) there exists ¯ t such that min{bt
L,bt
R} ∈ [bg,bo] for all periods t > ¯ t, and








(iii) If bo = b∗ then the probability of an extreme policy converges in probability to zero and party
reputations converge in probability to (bo,bo) (i.e., plim
t→+∞
σPt(bt) = 0 and plim
t→+∞
bt = (bo,bo)).
According to Proposition 7, the introduction of probabilistic elections qualiﬁes the equi-
librium dynamics described in Proposition 5 in two main respects. First, while moderate policies




τ that violate condition (13) of Lemma 1 for which extreme policies
may occur with positive probability even in the long-run. This case is described in part (ii)-(b)
of Proposition 7. To understand the diﬀerence in the two propositions, note that in part (ii) of
Proposition 5 party reputations converge to either (bg,bo) and party L wins with probability one,
or to (bo,bg) and party R wins with probability one. But with probabilistic elections party R may
win the election with probability s at reputations (bg,bo). Thus, if (bg,bo) ∈ BR ⇔ Tg(bo) > To(bg),
then an extreme policy may be pursued at (or near) reputations (bg,bo) after a surprise victory by
party R, and the same is true for reputations (bo,bg) and a surprise victory by party L. Since rep-
utations converge to levels (bg,bo), (bo,bg) along paths of play without surprise electoral outcomes,
extreme policies are occurring inﬁnitely often along the path of play. This establishes part (ii)-(b)
of Proposition 7. On the other hand, in the cases covered by part (ii)-(a) of Proposition 7, surprise
electoral victories and alternation of parties in government do not produce extreme policies because
neither party pursues an extreme policy with positive probability at reputations levels b ∈ [bg,bo]2.
















Goverment by Party R.
Goverment by Party L.
Figure 4: Probabilistic Elections and Dynamics in Case II.
The second main diﬀerence in the equilibrium dynamics of Proposition 6 compared to




m = 1 (i.e., case IIIb of the previous section) the long-
run steady-state levels of party reputations no longer depend on initial conditions. In particular,
contrary to the conclusion of part(iii)-(b) of Proposition 5, when initial party reputations are given
by b0 ∈ [0,1]2 \[bo,1]2, the party with the minimum reputation, say party P, may lose the election
(with probability s > 0) so that party P’s reputation adjusts to a higher level To(b0
P) > b0
P. Since
such surprise electoral outcomes are guaranteed to occur along the path of play, party reputations
eventually converge to (bo,bo) ∈ [0,1]2.
On the other hand, this change in reputation dynamics does not alter the policy dynamics
we established in part (iii) of Proposition 5 as it is still the case that moderate policies prevail with
probability one in the long-run. Similarly, despite the fact that extreme policies are possible for a
subset of transition probabilities in case II of the previous section when we introduce probabilistic
elections, case I (when bg > bo > b∗) still produces more policy extremism (and government
turnover) in equilibrium. This is because in case (ii)-(b) of Proposition 7 policy extremism and
government turnover occur due to electoral surprises, while policy extremism and alternation of
27the parties in government are not constrained by the value of the probability of electoral surprise,
s, when bg > bo > b∗. In sum, probabilistic elections introduce realism into the model but do not
alter the main conclusions of the previous section.
7. Conclusions
We have developed a model of two-party competition based on the assumption that political
parties enter the electoral arena with endogenously formed reputations regarding the prevailing
policy preferences within each party. These reputations shape the electorate’s expectations about
the policies that are likely to be pursued by each party, instead of relying on campaign promises
in order to infer the policies of future governments. The second basic premise of the model is that
party preferences exhibit inertia so that absent credible actions by the party in government party
reputations improve or deteriorate gradually. From these two simple premises we built a dynamic
model of two party competition in which equilibrium government policies are dependent not only
on the incumbent party’s reputation, but also on the opposition party’s reputation.
We showed that in robust equilibria in which parties care suﬃciently about oﬃce, the ruling
party pursues extreme policies when it has a relatively worse reputation compared to the opposition.
Barring electoral surprises in which parties with worse reputation win the election, extreme policies
occur in equilibrium when (a) both parties’ reputations are above some benchmark level and (b)
elections are close, that is, both parties have similar reputations. These equilibrium strategies
are consistent with two radically diﬀerent electoral and policy dynamics. One possible pattern of
dynamics involves regular government turnover and the recurrence of party reputations such that
the party that wins the election implements extreme policies with positive probability. The second
pattern of dynamics involves predominantly moderate policies and a strong incumbency advantage
for the governing party. Either dynamic may prevail depending on the relative speed with which
parties switch preferences while in government or in the opposition, according to condition (13).
Thus, the diﬀerent types of equilibrium dynamics that are permitted by the present analysis suggest
that in order to fully understand the nature of two party competition we must further study the
manner in which competition between diﬀerent ideological groups is resolved within political parties.
This shift of focus from inter-party competition to intra-party competition would allow us to develop
insights on the forces that determine the relative size of quantities that are exogenous in the present




Besides prompting a shift of focus from inter-party competition to intra-party competition,
the present model leaves a number of other open avenues for improvement. One such improve-
ment involves an increase of the time horizon which aﬀects the strategic calculations of political
actors. Perhaps the most important extension of the current model, though, would be to enrich
the policy/type space by allowing more than two policy choices and party types per party. More
party types and policy choices open the possibility for richer dynamics such that, for example, the
governing party pursues a relatively extreme policy even when it has a large reputational advantage
over the opposition party. If the opposition party has a really bad reputation, then the governing
party may be able to aﬀord to pursue such intermediate policies and maintain an (smaller) advan-
tage over the opposition. In particular, the government’s worse reputation due to the fact that it
does not pursue the most moderate policy need not come at the cost of losing the elections. The
restriction to only two party types that we impose in the present analysis does not permit this
type of policy making by the government, since any extreme policy choice renders the updated
reputation of the governing party worse than that of the opposition party under this assumption.
Appendix
In this appendix we prove Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 and Lemmas 1 and 2. Before we
proceed, we derive expressions for players’ expected payoﬀs. The expected payoﬀ of the voter M
from a government by party P in a period with party reputations b is







Also, the expected payoﬀ of party P from implementing a policy x
P
τ while in government in a period
















































τ;σ). Observe that the expected utility calculation in (17) reﬂects the uncertainty
of extreme types of party P regarding the type prevailing in the next period both in the opposition
29party, −P, as well as within their own party, P. We start with Proposition 1:
Proof of Proposition 1 We start by showing part (ii). Consider an equilibrium with strategies
σ = (σM,σL,σR), where party strategies satisfy σP(b) = 1 for all b ∈ [0,1]2, P ∈ {L,R}. If
we perturb party strategies by ε < 1
2, we have σε
P(b) = 1 − ε. Deﬁne the proﬁle of strategies
σε = (σM,σε
L,σε
R). Note that the original equilibrium strategy proﬁle is obtained when ε = 0, i.e.,
we have σ0 = σ. We use (16) to calculate voter’s expected utility when strategies σε are used and






m, P ∈ {L,R}. We now have
V (b,P;σε) > V (b,−P;σε) ⇔ bP < b-P, for all ε ∈ [0, 1
2).
Since the above holds for ε = 0 and σ0 = σ is an equilibrium, we must also have
bP < b-P ⇔ V (b,P;σ0) > V (b,−P;σ0) ⇒ σM(b,P) = 1 − σM(b,−P) = 1,
so we conclude that the voter’s strategy σM satisﬁes (8). Thus equilibrium σ is intuitive and it is
also robust since it satisﬁes (4) with perturbed strategies σε for all ε ∈ [0, 1
2).
Next, we show part (iii). Suppose that (9) is satisﬁed strictly and there exists an equilibrium
σ∗ with σ∗





e;σ∗) for these beliefs. Note that logically there exists a lower bound on expected utilities
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e;σ∗) for some b ∈ [0,1]2, proving part (iii).
It remains to prove part (i). First, we verify that there exists an equilibrium with σP(b) = 1






for all b ∈ [0,1]2 and all σ, so that strategy σP(b) = 1 for all b ∈ [0,1]2 is a (weak) best response
independent of the voting strategy σM. As a result, in order to establish existence of equilibrium
we only need specify a voting strategy that satisﬁes (4). We know from part (ii) that the voting
strategy must satisfy (8). If we set arbitrary values for σM(b,P) for b ∈ [0,1]2 such that bL = bR,
then the resultant strategy proﬁle constitutes a robust and intuitive equilibrium whenever (9) is
true.
Lastly, we need to show that when (9) fails there cannot exist an equilibrium with these
party strategies. Suppose instead that (9) fails and there exists an equilibrium σ∗ with σ∗
P(b) = 1
for all b ∈ [0,1]2, P ∈ {L,R}, to get a contradiction. Consider a period t with party P of type e in
government. We shall show that there exist beliefs bt ∈ [0,1]2 with bt
P < 1 for which party P has
a proﬁtable deviation from strategy σ∗
P. If the governing party follows its strategy and implements
a policy x
P














-P. Furthermore, by part (ii) the voter’s strategy σ∗
M satisﬁes (8), hence σ∗
M(bt+1,P) = 0 and the
expected payoﬀ of type e of party P implementing policy x
P













On the other hand, a one-period deviation to a moderate policy x
P











We now have that bt+1
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which is false for any bt
-P suﬃciently close to 1. This is a contradiction emanating from the hypothesis
that σ∗ is an equilibrium. 
We continue with the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2 Assume there exists a robust equilibrium σ∗ with strategies σ∗
P(b) = 0,
for all b ∈ [0,1]2, P ∈ {L,R}. We ﬁrst show that this equilibrium must also be intuitive, i.e., the
voting strategy σ∗
M must satisfy (8). Consider perturbed party strategies according to σε∗
P (b) = ε,
P ∈ {L,R}, with ε > 0, and compare the voter’s expected utility for reputations b with bP < b-P
when players use strategies σε∗ = (σ∗
M,σε∗
L ,σε∗
R ). We get














V (b,P;σε∗) > V (b,−P;σε∗).
32Since the above holds for all ε > 0 and σ∗ is a robust equilibrium, we conclude that we must have
σ∗
M(b,P) = 1. Thus, the robust equilibrium σ∗ must be intuitive as we wished to show.
In order to prove the proposition we will now show that for the robust and intuitive equilib-
rium with strategies σ∗ there exist party reputations such that σ∗
P is not a best response. Trivially
there exist reputations bt ∈ [0,1]2 such that Tg(bt
P) > To(bt
-P). Consider a government by party P in
period t with party reputations given by bt ∈ [0,1]2. Given strategy σ∗
P(bt) = 0 and applying (3), be-









Since we have assumed Tg(bt
P) > To(bt
-P), we have from (8) and the fact that the equilibrium with
strategies σ∗ is intuitive that σ∗
M(bt+1,P) = 0. If party P implements an extreme policy x
P
e in
period t instead, then since β(b,x
P
e;σ∗) = 1 we obtain bt+1





the last inequality follows from (1) and (2). Thus, when beliefs in period t are given by bt such
that Tg(bt
P) > To(bt
-P), we have σ∗
M(bt+1,P) = 0 whether party P pursues a moderate or an extreme














We conclude that there exist bt ∈ [0,1]2 such that σ∗
P(bt) = 0 is not a best response, and σ∗ cannot
be part of a robust equilibrium. 
Before we prove Proposition 3, we prove two lemmas.




























33since To(b-P) ≥ 1 − πo
m > 1 − π
g



































e − To(b-P))2 ≤ 0,
because Tg(bP) ≤ π
g
e.
The next Lemma is:
Lemma 4 Consider any equilibrium strategy proﬁle σ and reputations b ∈ [0,1]2.

































































eσP(b)bP < (1 − σP(b)bP)To(b-P) ⇔
Tg (bP) − To (b-P) < (πg














e;σ)) = Tg(1) = πg





34by (1) and (2).
Finally, part (iii) follows immediately from part (i) and (11).
We now prove Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3 Part (i) follows from Proposition 6 since condition (10) implies condition
(15) when s = 0. Part (ii) follows from Lemma 3. For part (iii), note that (b∗,b∗) constitutes the
unique solution of the system of linear equations
Tg(bL) − To(bR) = 0
Tg(bR) − To(bL) = 0,
for the unknowns (bL,bR). Furthermore, the equation Tg(bP) = To(b-P) is linear in parties’ reputa-
tions so that BP is formed as the intersection of the open half-space deﬁned by Tg(bP) > To(b-P)
and the unit square [0,1]2. Note that reputations (b∗,b∗) lie at the boundary of Be, reputations
(1,1) ∈ Be since Tg(1) = π
g
e > πo
e = To(1) by (1) and (2), and reputations (b∗,1),(1,b∗) / ∈ Be since
Tg(b∗) = To(b∗) < πo
e = To(1). As a result, the set Be = BL ∩ BR ⊂ [b∗,1]2. Part (iv) follows
from part (ii) and the fact that a voter pursuing an intuitive equilibrium induces an equilbrium
probability of an extreme policy equal to min{bLσL(b),bRσR(b)}. 
Next we prove Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 4 We prove the Proposition in two steps. In the ﬁrst step we show that
parties’ equilibrium probability of pursuing an extreme policy cannot be larger than that implied
by the strategies in (11).
1. For any intuitive equilibrium σ
0





P(b) for all b ∈ [0,1]2, where
σ∗
P(b) is given by (11). Obvious for b ∈ [0,1]2 such that bP = 1, since σ∗
P(b) = 1 in these cases. For
reputations b ∈ [0,1]2 with bP < 1, assume that σ
0
P(b) > σ∗
P(b) in order to get a contradiction. Since

















































),P) = 1. We



























m + G) >
r
R











































































), which contradicts the
assumption that σ
0




We conclude the proof by showing:
2. For any intuitive equilibrium σ
0





P(b) for all b ∈ [0,1]2,
where σ∗
P(b) is given by (11). The claim is obviously true for b ∈ [0,1]2 such that Tg(bP) ≤ To(b-P)
since σ∗
P(b) = 0 in those cases. Thus, it remains to consider reputations b ∈ [0,1]2 such that
Tg(bP) > To(b-P), and we will prove the claim by contradiction as in step 1. By part (i) of Lemma




















































),P) = 0, since σ
0
M constitutes an equilibrium strategy
that satisﬁes (8). Thus the expected payoﬀ from pursuing either policy, x
P




















From step 1 and the fact that πo


















































































































































We now prove Lemmas 1 and 2.
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) We have b > To(b) ⇔ b > πo
eb+(1−πo





e ⇔ b > bo. Also To(b) > bo ⇔
πo
eb + (1 − πo





















have made use of the fact that πo
e + πo
m − 1 > 0 from (2).
(ii) Same as in part (i) mutatis mutandis.
(iii) We start with the ﬁrst inequality, for which we have


















e) + (1 − πo
m)) > (1 − πo
m)((1 − πg














We proceed similarly for the second inequality, so now we have












e) − (1 − π
g
e) + (1 − πo






e) − (1 − πg
e) + (1 − πo




e) + (1 − πo
m)) − (1 − πg
m)((1 − πo



















37Proof of Lemma 2 Consider party reputations bt ∈ [0,1]2 at the beginning of period t. We
distinguish three cases:
Case 1, a government by party P ∈ {L,R} and Tg(bt
P) ≤ To(bt
-P): Then by (11) party












Case 2, a government by party P ∈ {L,R}, Tg(bt
P) > To(bt
-P), and party P implements
a moderate policy, xP










Case 3, a government by party P ∈ {L,R}, Tg(bt
P) > To(bt
-P), and party P implements an
extreme policy, xP












Hence, in all three cases min{bt+1
L ,bt+1
R } = min{Tg(bt
P),To(bt
-P)}, where P is the governing
party. Now we have
min{bt+1
L ,bt+1





















where we make use of parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1. Similarly we have
min{bt+1
L ,bt+1





















Part (i) now follows from (22) and (23) and parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1. We similarly obtain




m = 1 we have Tg(b) = b. 
Before we prove Proposition 6, observe that with probabilistic voting the expected payoﬀ
of party P from implementing a policy x
P
τ while in government in a period with party reputations













































τ;σ) is given by (3). We now proceed to the last proof.
Proof of Proposition 6 We will establish the existence of an intuitive equilibrium with party
strategies σ∗
P given by (11), and any voting strategy σ∗






































for reputations b = (bL,bR) such that bL = bR ∈ [1 − πo
m,πo
e]. Let σ∗ denote a proﬁle of such
strategies and specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs β(b,x
P
m;σ∗) for reputations b ∈ [0,1]2 with bP = 1
to β(b,x
P
m;σ∗) = To(b-P).7 The proof now proceeds in ﬁve steps. First, we show that the probability
speciﬁed in (25) is well-deﬁned.
1. σ∗
M(b) ∈ [0,1] for all b ∈ [0,1]2 such that bP = b-P ∈ [1 − πo
m,πo


























≥ 0 ⇒ σ∗
M(b) ≥ 0.










R(b) is weakly increasing in bR and weakly decreasing in bL by Lemma 3. Furthermore, we have
σ∗





























and the latter (using the fact that bL = bR ∈ [1 − πo
m,πo
e]) is implied by (15), completing the proof
of this step.
7A range of values for β(b,x
P
m;σ
∗) is consistent with equilibrium. Once more, observe that such beliefs with bP = 1
never occur along the path of play when π
g
e < 1.
392. The voter’s strategy, σ∗
M, is a best response. Note that by symmetry we have
V (b,P;σ∗) = V (b,−P;σ∗),
for all b ∈ [0,1]2 such that bP = b-P, so that any value of σ∗
M(b) ∈ [0,1] forms part of a best response
for such reputations. Furthermore, the party strategy σ∗
P(b) is weakly increasing in bP and weakly
decreasing in b-P by Lemma 3. Since σ∗
P(b) = σ∗
-P(b) if bP = b-P, we have
bP < b-P ⇒ σ∗
-P(b) ≥ σ∗
P(b) ⇔ V (b,P;σ∗) ≥ V (b,−P;σ∗),
and σ∗
M that satisﬁes (8) is a best response.
We show that party strategies constitute best responses in Steps 3 and 4.
3. If b ∈ [0,1]2 is such that Tg(bP) < To(b-P), then σ∗
P(b) is a best response. By part (ii) of Lemma 4,






e;σ∗) = Tg(1) = π
g













































P(b) = 0, we also have from (6) that β(b,x
P
m;σ∗) = bP. As a consequence, if party P imple-









































































































(1 − 2s)(G + rR
m − rL
m)
40But the last inequality is implied by (15) since πo






























































4. If b ∈ [0,1]2 is such that Tg(bP) ≥ To(b-P), then σ∗
P(b) is a best response. As in the previous
















e;σ∗),P) = 0 by (8). Note that part (iii) of Lemma 4 and (11) ensure








m;σ∗) = To(b-P) and the same is true by the speciﬁed
out-of-equilibrium beliefs when bP = 1. Thus, σ∗
M(b0(b,x
P
m;σ∗)) is given by (25). Now we make use
























































































































































m;σ∗) = (To(b-P),To(b-P)). We conclude that party strategy σ∗
P(b) is a
best response.
With Steps 2 to 4 we have established the existence of an intuitive equilibrium with strategies
σ∗ that satisfy (11) and (8). It remains to show that this equilibrium is also robust. This we show
in a last step:
5. Equilibrium σ∗ is robust. To show that σ∗ is robust, consider party strategies, σ∗ε
P , P ∈ {L,R},
that are obtained from σ∗
P for some ε > 0 according to (7). Let σε∗ = (σ∗
M,σε∗
L ,σε∗
R ). Note that we
still have V (b,P;σε∗) = V (b,−P;σε∗) if bP = b-P, and that (by Lemma 3) σε∗
P is weakly increasing
in bP, and weakly decreasing in b-P for all ε ∈ (0, 1
2), so that bP > b-P ⇒ σ∗ε
P (b) ≥ σ∗ε
-P(b). Thus, for
41all ε ∈ (0, 1
2) we must have:
bP > b-P ⇒
bPσ∗ε
P (b) > b-Pσ∗ε
-P(b) ⇒
V (b,P;σε∗) < V (b,−P;σε∗).
We conclude that σ∗ is a robust equilibrium, completing the proof of this step and of the proposition.

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